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Abstract 
 
Investment in exchange-traded funds (ETFs) has been remarkably robust in 
the course of the recent financial crisis. This paper analyzes investors’ 
perceptions of ETFs and other indexing products by comparing the answers 
to two surveys of ETF users carried out in 2008 and 2009, before and after 
the height of the financial crisis. We find that the crisis has divided the ETF 
market in two segments. Whereas ETFs in standard asset classes have been 
unaffected by the crisis, ETFs for alternative asset classes face challenges. 
However, ETFs are generally well ranked in comparison to other indexing 
products – presumably because of an increased focus on liquidity and 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis that culminated in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a US 
investment bank, has had pronounced repercussions in almost all areas of financial markets. 
While the crisis was limited to mortgage backed securities initially, it spread to credit markets in 
general and - in the end - almost all asset classes were affected. Developed and emerging equity 
markets, corporate bond markets, real estate, commodities, and hedge funds have seen 
considerable losses. Arnott and West (2008) point out that returns were disappointing for all of 
16 different asset classes in September 2008, as all of them were affected by the market turmoil 
at that time.  
 
In line with this broad-based decline of asset prices, assets under management in investment 
products have diminished as well. In addition, significant withdrawals by mutual and hedge fund 
investors at the end of 2008 (IMF, 2008) have led to a further decline. Compared to the many 
financial products that have seen a substantial decrease in popularity, exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs) stand out as one of the few financial products that seem not to have been hit by the 
financial crisis. For example, European mutual funds suffered outflows of USD 570 billion over 
the course of 2008. ETFs, by contrast, collected USD 74 billion (Fuhr, 2009).  
 
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on investors’ perception of exchange-traded 
funds which may help explain this phenomenon. By comparing the answers to two surveys on the 
usage of exchange-traded funds by European investors carried out in 2008 and 2009, we aim to 
identify investors’ perceptions before and after the crisis. Surveying investors allows us to gather 
information beyond publicly available data on assets under management and trading volume, and 
may help shed some light on investors’ motivations and perceptions.  
 
Since ETFs are not the only financial product that allows obtaining a broad exposure to asset 
markets, we compare the results of ETFs with investors’ views of competing indexing products, 
such as futures, total return swaps, and traditional index funds. Thereby, we hope to give valuable 
insights not only the absolute impact of the crisis on ETFs, but also in relation to comparable 
vehicles. Finally, the data obtained from the surveys also offer the opportunity to compare the 
views of different types of investors.  
 
The two surveys that this study draws on where conducted among European investors before and 
after the height of the financial crisis. When the first survey was conducted in the early months of 
2008, the financial crisis was still in its early phase, and mostly limited to the US mortgage 
sector. In contrast, the second survey in 2009 can be regarded to be well impacted by the 
financial crises, following the bankruptcy of major international banks and insurance companies.  
 
The first survey exclusively targeted at European institutional investors, such as asset 
management firms, insurance companies, and pension funds. To read the possibly diverging 
views and opinions on the use of exchange-traded funds and other indexing products across 
different investor types, the second survey in 2009 was extended to include private bankers, 
family offices, and private investors as well.  
 
Although exchange-traded funds have existed for almost two decades, they have only recently 
drawn the attention of the research community. An excellent overview is provided by Deville 
(2007). First influential papers on ETFs include Gastineau (2001) on early developments of 
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ETFs, and Poterba and Shoven (2002) on ETF taxation. Cherry (2004), Engle and Sarkar (2006), 
Kayali (2007) and Madura and Ngo (2008) investigate the differences between ETF prices and 
their NAV. This paper is also related to the growing academic analysis of the financial crisis 
2007/2008. Mizen (2008), Reinhard and Rogoff (2008), Shiller (2008), and Blanchard (2009) 
provide, for example, a detailed background of the financial crisis, Brunnermeier (2008) and 
Allen and Carletti (2008) investigate more closely the liquidity problems originating from the 
crisis, and Gorton (2008) looks at complex role of derivates in the crisis.    
 
To our knowledge, there is very little academic literature that examines the impact of the 
financial crisis on the exchange-traded fund market. The only paper that comes close to the 
analysis provided in this paper is by Tucker and Sanchez-Marin (2003), which investigates the 
performance of ETFs during crises caused by market interruptions and trade suspensions of key 
ETF constituents. By comparing usage and satisfaction of exchange-traded funds before and after 
the height of the recent financial crisis, our paper provides insights on the impact of this crisis on 
investors’ perceptions. In addition, we provide survey evidence of how investors view different 
indexing products, thus complementing work that looks directly at product characteristics and 
capital flows (Elton, Gruber, Commer and Li (2001) or Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004)).  
 
Our objective is not to give a comprehensive assessment of the quality of ETFs as a financial 
instrument. Rather, we focus on investor perceptions concerning ETFs and – more specifically – 
the dynamics of perceptions over the recent financial crisis. We find that overall investment in 
ETFs has been remarkably stable during the financial crisis. In some market segments, such as 
equity ETFs, both use and satisfaction even increased in the course of the year 2008. In 2009, 
more than 84% of all participating institutional investors have been investing in equity ETFs, up 
from 75% in 2008. Similarly, investment in government bond ETFs gained popularity during the 
financial crisis. In contrast, the financial crisis imposes severe challenges for ETFs in alternative 
asset classes, especially in the case of hedge fund ETFs, where both usage and satisfaction levels 
have dropped sharply within 12 months. 
 
When comparing ETFs with other financial products that allow for trading baskets of assets, we 
find that ETFs and futures are the preferred indexing instruments. Compared to traditional index 
funds and total return swaps, these products are perceived to have an edge in terms of liquidity. In 
addition, the financial crisis has increased investors’ attention to the main drawback of total 
return swaps: counterparty risk. The financial crisis may have led to an increased focus on 
liquidity and counterparty credit risk. Hence it would not be a surprise if after the financial crisis, 
ETFs and futures were to take market share from total return swaps which are judged to lead to 
significant counterparty risk. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we shortly present the basic 
concept of exchange-traded funds and discuss the impact of financial crisis on indexing products. 
Section 3 outlines the methodology and data. The main results of the survey, the practitioners’ 
view on ETFs and its alternatives, are presented in section 4. In addition, section 5 offers a 
comparison of responses obtained from private wealth managers to those from institutional 
investment managers. The conclusion in section 6 offers some implications of this research for 
both product providers and investors.  
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2. Exchange-Traded Funds and the Financial Crisis 
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are an important product innovation of the past decade. In this 
section, we give first a short overview on ETFs. Then we analyze the financial crisis and its 
impact on ETFs and other financial products. 
2.1. Overview of Exchange-Traded Funds and Other Indexing Products 
 
2.1.1. Understanding Exchange-Traded Funds 
 
An exchange-traded fund is an investment vehicle whose shares (units) are traded on stock 
exchanges at market-determined prices. Most ETFs are similar to traditional index funds that 
consist of a basket of securities and attempt to track, as closely as possible, the performance of 
market indices or benchmarks. With ETFs, investors can gain broad exposure to equity, fixed 
income, and alternative asset markets with little effort and at low cost.  
As such, an ETF is a hybrid of a stock and a fund. Like mutual funds, ETFs are registered as 
open-end funds, continuously offering new fund shares to the public and required to buy back 
outstanding shares upon a shareholder's request and at a price based on the current value of the 
fund's net assets. Unlike traditional index funds, however, they are distinct investment vehicles 
with stock-like characteristics: they are listed on the exchange and, like stocks, they can be 
bought and sold at market prices during trading hours. Similar to stocks, they can also be sold 
short, lent out, or bought on the margin. 
 
An ETF’s replication mechanism is one of its defining features. ETFs come in three flavors: 
physical index replication funds, statistical replication, and swap-based replication. An ETF is 
considered a physical replicating index fund (sometimes also cash-based replication) if the ETF 
manager holds all the constituents of the underlying index in the same proportion as the 
constituent securities of the index. This approach offers a natural replication of the target index. 
The drawback is that this is difficult to implement when the index to be replicated is a broad 
index with a large number of securities. This difficulty arises from liquidity problems with index 
constituents, clearing and settlement problems, and the high cost of executing the basket of 
securities. So, even physical replication will lead to tracking error.  
ETFs can also use statistical sampling strategies to replicate the chosen index. Instead of fully 
replicating the index, the fund invests in only a fraction of the total index constituents. The aim is 
to replicate the index by focusing on highly liquid underlyings. This form is generally used for 
very broad indices, where it is less costly than full replication. But it necessarily leads to tracking 
error, the magnitude of which depends on the accuracy of the statistical replication model.  
Finally, there are swap-based ETFs. The basic idea of these funds is to outsource the tracking 
error management to a counterparty: the fund itself invests in a broad basket that does not fully 
replicate the index. The replication itself is provided by the swap counterparty, and any 
differences in the performance of the basket and that of the index are counterbalanced by the 
swap payments. The advantages of this third replication technique are that the ETF does not bear 
tracking error risk and that swap-based replication comes at low cost. However, it leads to 
counterparty risk with respect to the outperformance of the index over the ETF’s physical basket 
of securities, and which is limited by European regulation to 10% of the fund’s value.  
 
 
2.1.2. Alternatives to Exchanged-Traded Funds 
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In addition to ETFs, there is a variety of financial products that allow simple trades of large 
baskets of assets: traditional index funds, futures, and total return swaps. Because of their similar 
features, they can be regarded—depending on the investment purpose—as alternatives to ETFs. 
 
The closest of these alternatives are traditional index funds. Index funds can be viewed as 
unlisted ETFs, and hence can be bought from and sold only to the managing company of the 
mutual fund. Investors can also opt for derivative instruments (futures and total return swaps) to 
trade large baskets of assets. Futures are standardized forward contracts that are exchange-traded 
and thus highly liquid. Total return swaps, by contrast, are not traded on an exchange; they are 
over-the-counter contracts. Here, the total return of an index (made up of both price changes and 
dividends) is swapped for fixed regular cash flows. It is important to note that OTC instruments 
like total return futures expose index investors to counterparty credit risk exchange-traded 
instruments like futures mitigate this risk through the clearinghouse mechanism. 
 
2.2. The Financial Crisis  
 
The objective of our paper is to assess evolutions in investors’ attitudes towards the instruments 
listed above in the context of the recent financial crisis. Therefore, it is useful to recall the main 
developments as well as their implications for investors.  
 
2.2.1. The Financial Crisis 2007-2009 
 
The sub prime mortgage crisis began in 2007 and was triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage 
delinquencies in the United States. The crisis first affected the financial sector in February 2007, 
when HSBC, one of the world's largest banks, wrote down its holdings of sub prime-related 
mortgage-backed securities. However, the crisis reached its peak only in late 2008, when large 
US banks needed to either get bailed out or declare bankruptcy, as for example Merrill Lynch and 
Lehman Brothers.  
We can draw conclusions from our survey on how investor perceptions changed over this crisis, 
as the two surveys were conducted before and after the height of the crisis. As an indicator to 
time when the crisis reached its height, it is useful to look at the TED spread, which is shown in 
exhibit 1. The TED spread, defined as the difference between the three-month T-bill interest rate 
and three-month LIBOR, is an indicator of stress in the money market, reflecting both liquidity 
risk and credit risk in the banking sector (see Brunnermeier (2008)). The initial sub prime crisis 
led to a first sharp rise in the TED spread in August 2007. The TED spread however only reached 
its peak about one year later, in October 2008. 
 
[EXHIBIT 1 goes here] 
 
2.2.2. Implications of the Financial Crisis 
 
The financial crisis had many implications for financial markets and investors. However, for 
exchange traded funds and other indexing products, the two most important problems arouse 
from liquidity constraints and increased counterparty risk. 
Because of high uncertainty in financial markets the liquidity of many traded assets decreased 
sharply, especially those that face even liquidity problems in normal financial conditions, such as 
corporate bonds or alternative assets. As a consequence of illiquid underlying assets, ETF have 
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seen partly large pricing differences with respect to their net asset value (NAV). For example, 
because of thinly traded corporate bonds with high bid-ask spreads, arbitrageurs could not profit 
from pricing differences without distorting the prices altogether. Of course, illiquid underlying 
assets posed also problems for other indexing products, such as traditional mutual funds some of 
which had to be closed temporarily.  
Besides liquidity problems, counterparty risk was one of the major problems of financial markets 
during the financial crisis. At the latest since the prominent failure of Lehman Brothers, a leading 
provider of derivate products, on September 15, 2008, market participants increasingly became 
aware of the risks related to their counterparty positions. Counterparty risk is especially a 
problem for non-traded derivate instruments, such as swaps. As a consequence, the financial 
crisis can be expected to have a strong impact on the perceived risk of OTC instruments, such as 
total return swaps.   
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Survey Design and Methodology 
This study draws on the answers to two surveys on the usage of exchange-traded funds by 
European investors carried out in the years 2008 and 2009. When the first survey was conducted 
in the first four months of 2008, the financial crisis was still in its early phase, and mostly limited 
to the US mortgage sector. In contrast, the second survey was conducted in January and February 
2009 and can be regarded to be well impacted by the financial crises, following the bankruptcy of 
major international banks and insurance companies1.  Hence, opposing the results of the two 
surveys allows to directly analyse the impact of the financial crisis on the investors’ perception of 
indexing products.  
  
Besides minor modifications, both surveys had identical questionnaires, thereby permitting for a 
convenient comparison of the results before and during the crisis. Most of the questions were 
multiple-choice questions, with the possibility to choose one or more answers, depending on the 
question. The questionnaires had three parts. In the first series of questions, survey participants 
were asked about the role ETFs play in their asset allocation decisions. The next set of questions 
turned to practical aspects of ETF investment, such as satisfaction with ETF products and 
applications of ETFs for portfolio optimization. In the last set of questions, the questionnaire asks 
the respondents to compare ETFs and other investment instruments that can be considered close 
substitutes: index funds, futures, and total return swaps. Finally, we invited the survey 
respondents to express their views of future developments in the ETF market. The extract of the 
survey questions that have been used for this study can be found in the appendix. 
 
The first survey exclusively targeted at European institutional investors, such as asset 
management firms, insurance companies, and pension funds. To read the possibly diverging 
views and opinions on the use of exchange-traded funds and other indexing products across 
different investor types, the second survey in 2009 was extended to include respondents from the 
private wealth management sector (private bankers, family offices, private investors) as well.  
 
                                                 
1 For the first survey, the first response was received on January 29, 2008, the last on April 21, 2009. For the second 
survey, the first response was received on January 23, 2009, the last on February 26, 2009 
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Both surveys were taken with an online questionnaire that was distributed through electronic mail 
messages and through a link on a website devoted to asset management research.2 Respondents 
were asked to submit their responses by filling out the online questionnaire and leaving their 
contact details. 
3.2. Data 
In total we received 100 full answers to the first survey, and 357 to the second survey. The final 
data set used in this study hence contains 457 responses, 100 of which obtained in 2008, and 357 
in the year 2009, where the target audience was larger.3 
 
[EXHIBIT 2 goes here] 
 
Exhibit 2 summarises the breakdown of professional groups of the respondents. Institutional 
investors account with 74.8% for the large majority of the sample. Representatives of investment 
and asset management companies are the most important professional group out of institutional 
investors (58.2%), followed by pension funds (6.3%) and banks (3.9%).  The remaining 25.2% of 
the data set belongs to the private wealth management sector.  
Since private asset management and institutional asset management are typically understood to 
be of different nature, we focus on respondents from institutional investment management when 
comparing the results between 2008 and 2009. Since respondents from private wealth 
management make up a significant part of responses in 2009, we present an analysis of their 
responses in section 5 of this paper.  
 
[EXHIBIT 3 goes here] 
 
Most of the 457 respondents are based in Europe, a large part of which are from France, 
Switzerland, and the UK, as exhibit 3 shows. Finally, exhibit 4 shows the assets under 
management of the companies for which the survey respondents work. As was to be expected, 
there are a few large firms in the asset management industry that have more than EUR 100bn in 
assets under management. However, the surveys mainly reflect the views of medium-sized 
companies, with assets under management of between EUR 100mn and 10bn. 
 
[EXHIBIT 4 goes here] 
3.3. Limitations 
Like any study based on surveys, this study might suffer from some problems. First, the sample 
of survey participants was not taken randomly from the target population for this study, but is 
based on a database of contacts of institutional and private investors. Since this sample might 
differ from the total population of the ETF investors, this procedure could lead to sample-
selection bias. Participation was also entirely voluntary, so there is a non-response (or self-
selection) bias. Practitioners who responded to the questionnaire could have views different from 
those of the industry as a whole. Non-response could involve other biases as well. Professionals 
from smaller companies, for example, may have been more (or less) likely to respond to our 
                                                 
2 We used the website of the EDHEC-Risk Institute to publish the survey: www.edhec-risk.com. 
3 The large increase in responses obtained in 2009 compared to the year before can be explained by the enlarged 
target group, and a larger set of contacts to which the 2009 survey was distributed.  Note that we omit respondents 
who did not give full details on their professional affiliation and the category of their company, since we need this 
data to sort respondents. 
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questionnaire. As a consequence, the results of the study could be biased in one direction or the 
other. Finally, survey respondents had no economic incentive to report their true beliefs, 
especially since the survey was not anonymous. But we see no compelling reason to hide true 
opinions, and we find no empirical evidence that respondents did so. However, overall, we 
believe that the regional diversity and fair balance of asset management professionals make the 
study largely representative of European ETF investors.  
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present the main results of this study by comparing the answers to the two 
surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009. Comparing the results from both surveys allows us to 
analyse the impact of the crisis on the investors’ perception of exchange-traded funds and other 
indexing products.  
In the first subsection, we take a close look at the use of and satisfaction with ETFs of 
institutional investors. In section 4.2, we then compare the institutional investors’ views of ETFs 
with their views of investment instruments that can be considered close substitutes: futures, total 
return swaps, and index funds. In addition, we invite survey respondents to express their views of 
future developments in the index product market.  
4.1. Use and Satisfaction with Exchange-traded Funds  
 
First, we analyse the use of exchange-traded funds in different asset classes. Exhibit 5 shows the 
proportion of institutional investors that indicate they have invested a positive fraction of total 
assets in exchange-traded funds. The table divides assets in six different asset classes: equities, 
government bonds, corporate bonds, commodities, real estate, and hedge funds. The results show 
that equity ETFs are by far the most popular ETF segment: in 2009, more than 83% of all 
participating institutional investors have been investing in these products. Commodities ETFs, 
government and corporate bond ETFs come next, with a market penetration between 31%-42%. 
Real estate and hedge fund ETFs are less popular. 
When comparing the respondents’ answers of 2008 and 2009, we can detect remarkable changes 
that occurred in the course of the financial crisis for two asset classes. On the one hand, the 
fraction of investors using equity ETFs increased significantly by 8.5% from 75% in 2008 to 
83.5% in 2009. On the other hand, real estate ETFs have experienced a significant decrease in 
usage in the course of the financial crisis, declining from 31% in 2008 to only 21.5% a year later. 
In all other asset classes, ETF usage remained largely constant.  
 
[EXHIBIT 5 goes here] 
 
Next, we investigate the institutional investors’ satisfaction with ETFs or ETF-like products. 
Exhibit 6 shows that most investors are highly satisfied with their ETFs, generally attaining 
satisfaction levels in the range from 70% to 90%. In 2009, equity ETFs achieve the highest 
satisfaction with more than 91% of investors indicating to be satisfied. Government bond ETFs 
rank second (88.4%), followed by commodity ETFs (79.6%). Only hedge fund ETFs obtain 
rather poor views by investors. In 2009, only about one in three investors is satisfied with his 
hedge fund ETF (34.2%). 
Looking at the impact of the financial crisis, it can be seen that satisfaction remained stable for 
equity and bond ETFs. However, alternative asset class ETFs suffered in popularity among 
investors. Especially investors’ satisfaction with hedge fund ETFs decreased by more than 50%, 
which is an economically important and statistically significant change in satisfaction level.  
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[EXHIBIT 6 goes here] 
 
Finally, exhibit 7 presents the fraction of total investments accounted for by exchange-traded 
funds. In this table, only respondents that actually have invested into this asset class are 
considered. In 2009, ETFs account for almost a third of total investments in equity (32.3%) by 
ETF users. It should be noted that this number is not representative of the overall assets 
represented by ETFs compared to the amount of equity held market-wide. The number simply 
reflects the average proportion that an equity ETF user holds in such ETFs compared to his other 
equity holdings4. Exchange-traded funds are also an important means to obtain exposure to 
commodity markets (21.9% in 2009). For other asset classes, ETFs are rather unimportant.  
With the exception of hedge fund investment which declined slightly from 6.9% to 5.5%, the 
percentage of investments accounted for by ETFs increased in almost all asset classes compared 
to 2008. Relative growth was especially remarkable in the equity universe, for government 
bonds, and real estate products – despite the financial crisis. The increase in these segments is in 
the order of 7% to 10%, which is significant at the 5% level.  
 
[EXHIBIT 7 goes here] 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that the financial crisis has not affected all ETF products in 
the same way. Equity and government bond ETF products can be regarded as clear winners of the 
crisis; they gained in both market share and satisfaction levels. Against the backdrop of the 
financial turmoil, equity and government bond ETFs are probably perceived to be a convenient 
tool to obtain liquid exposure to these asset classes – despite considerable losses in equity 
markets. These figures highlight the on-going popularity of ETFs in standard asset classes.  
Exchange-traded funds in the alternative asset universe are, in contrast, adversely affected by the 
financial crisis, especially those that are replicate real estate investments and hedge funds. The 
decline in ETF usage by about a third in the real estate segment is remarkable, and might be 
explained by the special nature of real estate ETFs. Instead of directly investing in real estate, real 
estate ETFs usually replicate real estate indices that are based on real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), listed collective equity investment vehicles that provide relatively high liquidity. 
However, these indices cannot be considered fully representative of institutional investment in 
real estate, basically because of the criteria—listing, capitalization, and liquidity—on which their 
components are selected. As a result of this design, real estate ETFs usually have much higher 
equity market beta than unlisted funds and therefore offer different risk and return characteristics 
(Lee and Stevenson, 2005). So, in the wake of the financial crisis, real estate ETFs have lost 
considerably more than comparable directly invested assets, which has presumably led to greater 
dissatisfaction as well.  However, it should be recalled that in 2009, real estate ETFs account for 
more of total real estate assets compared to 2008 (exhibit 7). At first sight, this seems to be 
contradicting to lower satisfaction and a decline in real estate ETF users. Still, it might that the 
real estate sector got relatively less interesting to investors, but not so much the ETFs themselves. 
The reasons for the increasing dissatisfaction with hedge fund ETFs may have different origins. 
Recent surveys, for example, have shown that many practitioners are not convinced of the value 
of the hedge fund ETFs offered on the markets (Amenc and Schröder, 2008). They believe that 
the behaviour of hedge fund managers is not replicable as such and consequently that any 
                                                 
4 As of the first quarter of 2009, the assets managed by equity ETFs in Europe made up € 62.5 billion, which does 
not correspond to a large part of equity market capitalisation (Constandinides et al., 2010).. 
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replication product is unlikely to replicate any managerial skill. And with the crisis many of these 
products have performed poorly.  
Although also part of the alternative investment class, commodity ETFs are rather stable during 
the crisis, even increasing their market share out of total commodity investments. Still, 
satisfaction levels declined as well. Finally, corporate bond ETFs are remarkably robust to the 
financial crisis. Despite temporarily pricing problems with respect to NAV, their usage and 
satisfaction remained rather unchanged. 
The bottom line is that the financial crisis appears to have divided the ETF market in two distinct 
segments: ETF in standard asset classes have benefited from the financial crisis. In contrast, more 
exotic ETFs in alternative asset classes face some severe challenges, especially in the case of 
hedge fund ETFs. 
  
In the next question, respondents are asked to express their opinion on their preferred replication 
method for ETFs. Exhibit 8 shows that more than two thirds of ETF investors prefer the pure 
replication method. Synthetic ETF replication that relies on derivatives, such as swaps, comes 
second. Only less than 10% of respondents favor statistical replication methods. 
In the course of the year 2008, the fraction of investors favoring pure replication increased 
significantly; most of all at the cost of the synthetic replication. In the light of the financial crisis, 
most of all after the Lehman collapse, investors probably fear increased counterparty risk 
concerning the swap position of the ETF. However, it should be noted, that even with this 
increased reluctance to accept counterparty risk, investors prefer synthetical replication to 
statistical replication techniques. The counterparty credit risk of synthetic replication ETFs is in 
fact confined to the outperformance of the index with respect to the physical basket of assets and 
it is limited to 10% of the ETF’s net asset value due to European regulations. These limits on 
counterparty risk may explain that, despite of the financial crisis, synthetic replication ETFs are 
still more popular than statistical replication ETFs. Moreover, in section 4.2., it will become 
evident that investors make a distinction between such limited counterparty risk and the full 
counterparty risk of direct investments in total returns swaps.     
 
[EXHIBIT 8 goes here] 
 
For some asset classes, the full replication of a given index by buying all underlying securities is 
difficult, or even not possible. This is especially the case for alternative asset ETFs that invest 
largely in illiquid assets exhibiting high transaction costs, thereby reducing overall performance 
of the ETF. Corporate bond ETFs face this problem as well, since very few corporate bonds are 
actively traded. Hence, other replication methods have to be used in these asset classes. In the 
light of low acceptance of alternative replication methods as displayed in exhibit 8, alternative 
asset ETF providers face challenges in marketing their products. In order to evaluate whether at 
least users of alternative asset ETFs are more open to advanced replicating methods, we compare 
their answers to the remaining respondents. Indeed, we find that users of ETFs for hedge funds, 
real estate, and corporate bonds significantly more accept other replication techniques, such as 
those based on sampling or using derivatives (a Fisher test yields a p-value below 0.1, the 
detailed results are not shown for brevity).  
 
Finally, we examine whether and how the financial crisis has changed investors’ use of advanced 
ETF forms and ETF products, or of sophisticated ETF trading techniques. Exhibit 9 shows that 
the use of sophisticated forms of ETFs has increased in 2009—albeit from a low basis. The use of 
inverse ETFs (also called short ETFs) has doubled; about one in three ETF investors now use 
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them. Other advanced practices, such as shorting ETFs and securities lending, are more 
widespread as well. But options on ETFs are still used by only 6% of respondents. 
Using inverse ETFs or shorting ETFs is a means of hedging the portfolio’s exposure to declining 
markets, a practice that might well have some appeal in times of financial crisis. These products 
enjoyed little favor before 2008; by 2009, however, views of them have changed and use of 
inverse ETFs and short sales of ETFs have increased significantly (at the 5% level). 
 
[EXHIBIT 9 goes here] 
 
Another interesting question is whether a higher familiarity with exchange-traded funds leads to 
differences in ETF usage. In fact, it appears a reasonable conjecture that investors that are 
actively using ETFs in an advanced way are also investing into more exotic ETF products, or 
invest higher fractions of their wealth into ETFs. What is more, advanced ETF users might be 
more critical with their ETF investments in terms of product quality and performance, as 
expressed by their overall satisfaction. 
Hence, we sort all institutional investors into two different groups: we call sophisticated ETF 
users those who use at least one of the advances ETF usages as presented in exhibit 9, i.e. using 
short ETFs, options on ETFs, shorting ETFs themselves, or lending ETF units. Then we compare 
their use and satisfaction with those of non-sophisticated ETF users, the remaining institutional 
ETF users. 
The results, see exhibit 10, clearly indicate that sophisticated ETF users exhibit different 
investment patterns compared to non-sophisticated investors: sophisticated investors rely more 
often on ETFs for investments in equities (88.9% vs. 76.4%), commodities (52.4% vs. 36.1%), 
real estate (30.9% vs. 20.3%), and hedge funds (26.2% vs. 12.5%) compared to non-sophisticated 
investors. All these differences are significant at the 5% level (Fisher-test). Only for the usage of 
bond ETFs, no difference between sophisticated investors and less sophisticated investors is 
detectable. 
 
[EXHIBIT 10 goes here] 
 
Next, sophisticated investors also invest significantly higher fractions out of their total 
investments into ETFs. For example, sophisticated investors have invested on average 33.5% of 
their equity assets into ETFs compared to 27.0% of non-sophisticated investors (p<0.1, Fisher 
test), see exhibit 11. The same holds true for the commodity investments, where sophisticated 
investors allocate 27.0% of their asset to ETFs, as opposed to 16.4% of non-sophisticated 
investors (p<0.05, Fisher test).    
 
[EXHIBIT 11 goes here] 
 
However, being a sophisticated investor does not appear to have a big impact on the satisfaction 
with ETFs. In contrast to the conjecture, sophisticated ETF investors are even happier with their 
equity ETFs, e.g.: 94.6% of sophisticated investors declare to be satisfied with their equity ETFs 
compared to 88.3% of non-sophisticated investors (p<0.1, Fisher test). For all other asset classes, 
there is no difference in reported satisfaction (exhibit 12). 
 
[EXHIBIT 12 goes here] 
 
All in all, these findings suggest that familiarity with ETF products translates positively in their 
usage. This might no be completely surprising as such. However, given that ETFs are still a 
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rather new financial product, growing familiarity with ETFs might explain their strong 
development even during the crisis.  
 
4.2. Comparing ETFs to Competing Indexing Products 
 
In this section, we compare institutional investors’ views on four investment instruments that 
allow the simple execution of trades in large baskets of assets: exchange-traded funds, futures, 
total return swaps, and traditional index funds. We first compare respondents’ views on liquidity 
and on the future use of these indexing products, then we look at some specific aspects of each of 
these products.5 
 
We ask respondents to rate the liquidity of the four indexing products. For each product, 
respondents had the possibility to choose between “very good”, “fairly good”, and “poor”. We 
translate these answers to a scale from one to three. The average scores of the answers are 
presented in exhibit 13. The higher the score, the better the products are judged. 
The table shows that respondents believe that futures are the most liquid indexing product, 
attaining very high ratings of up to 2.80, close to 3.0, the maximum score possible.  The liquidity 
of ETFs ranks second, obtaining scores between 2.23 and 2.40. By contrast, respondents view 
index funds as slightly less liquid than ETFs and they view total return swaps to be the least 
liquid among the indexing instruments.  
When looking at the respondents’ answers over time, the analysis shows that the liquidity of 
ETFs is rated better in 2009 compared to the year before, despite the financial crisis. The 
opposite holds true for total return swaps; compared to 2008, the liquidity of this OTC derivative 
is clearly judged worse. Finally, the financial crisis has no impact on the respondents’ views of 
the liquidity of futures and traditional index funds. These results underscore the importance of 
liquidity during financial crises form an investor’s perspective: both exchange-traded indexing 
products, i.e. futures and ETFs, have clearly an edge over their non-listed counterparts, index 
funds and total return swaps.  
 
[EXHIBIT 13 goes here] 
 
How does the financial crisis affect the expected future use of indexing products? Exhibit 14 
shows the respondents’ expected use of the four product categories we analyzed. The higher the 
score, the more the products are expected to be used in the future by institutional investors.   
Respondents report that they expect to use both futures and ETFs more heavily in the future. In 
fact, those who plan to use these two instruments more heavily far outnumber those who plan to 
use them less heavily, with scores close to their maximal level of three. Despite the strong past 
                                                 
5 Other than the criteria we list here, there are of course other aspects that investors may use to rate the various indexing vehicles. 
For example, indexing is often justified by its low cost. However, we do not report such results here, since our focus is on the 
dynamics of investor perceptions before and after the crisis and the fees of the various instruments tend to be rather stable over 
short time periods. It should also be noted that the evaluation of costs of these instruments is specific to the usage that is made. In 
particular, the position size and frequency of trading determine the relative merits of each instrument. For example, ETFs tend to 
have lower management fees than index funds. Gastineau (2001) underlines the reasons for the cost efficiency of ETFs over index 
funds. First, ETFs are typically very large funds, allowing for economies of scale and, second, expenses for the transfer agency 
function of mutual funds do not occur with ETFs. When analysing overall costs of the investment, Kostovetsky (2003) finds that 
for large amounts invested, ETFs are favourable to index funds, while for small amounts, the high trading costs make ETFs less 
attractive unless the holding period is very long. In the current paper, perceptions of costs are not analysed directly but are 
indirectly reflected in the overall satisfaction of respondents with ETFs. 
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growth of ETFs, investors expect to rely on these products even more in the future. Total return 
swaps and traditional index funds, by contrast, are likely to play smaller and smaller roles: the 
asset managers who expect to rely less on these instruments outnumber those who expect to rely 
more heavily on them, with scores below their neutral level of two points. 
When looking at expected developments in the four indexing products over time, the table shows 
very clearly that total return swaps seem to be the losers of the crisis: expected future use of these 
OTC derivates has decreased significantly in the course of the year 2008. Presumably because of 
their low liquidity and their exposure to counterparty credit risk, total return swaps have got less 
attractive. Taken together, the table indicates that the crisis does not harm indexing vehicles as 
such, but shifts the focus on liquid financial products, at the expense of less liquid products, most 
of all total return swaps and traditional index funds. 
 
[EXHIBIT 14 goes here] 
 
In exhibit 15, we look at several specific problems of some indexing products – and the impact 
the financial crisis had on them.  
First, we ask respondents for their opinions on ETF pricing errors with respect to the net asset 
value (NAV). In 2009, possible mispricing with respect to NAV was of concern to 64% of 
respondents, compared to 72% in the year before (see panel A). This finding is somewhat 
surprising, because of two reasons: First, Engle and Sarkar (2006) find that the premiums or 
discounts on fund NAVs are typically small and disappear very quickly, suggesting that 
respondents might overstate the problem. It may be that the respondents to our survey associate 
the problem of non-synchronous observations of fund prices and fund NAVs with the problem of 
mispricing, which is in fact another problem altogether. Second, some ETF products, such as 
ETFs on corporate bonds, have seen mispricing problems during the peak of the financial crisis at 
the end of 2008 caused by illiquid underlying securities. Hence, if at all, one may have expected 
that the investors got more sensitive to this problem, and not less. This finding suggests that the 
ETF pricing mechanism is regarded to be reliable, even in times of a liquidity crisis.  
 
 
In a direct comparison of all four instruments, futures fare remarkably well and can be viewed as 
the greatest rival to ETFs in implementing indexing strategies. A drawback of futures is that they 
are derivative instruments, require roll-over transactions, and involve margin calls. When asked 
directly, around 40% of the respondents report that margin calls are problematic for them (see 
panel B). The rolling over of positions and the fact that futures are derivatives is seen less 
problematic, especially in 2009.  
Overall, the significant percentage of respondents seeing margin calls jibes with the relatively 
negative view of the operational burdens futures entail. The financial crisis may again be the 
reason: the combination of high market volatility and dried up liquidity makes it harder to supply 
the cash to meet the margin calls.  On the other hand, the comparison of answers between 2008 
and 2009 reveals that rolling over positions is perceived significantly less a problem compared to 
the year before. Finally, the percentage of investors having a problem with the fact that futures 
are derivatives has not changed in the course of the financial crises. 
 
In the last part of this section, we turn to investor’s views on specific issues related to investment 
in total return swaps. The survey addresses two specific problems with TRSs: the requirement for 
over-the-counter trading and the associated counterparty credit risk. 
As panel C of exhibit 15 shows, trading over the counter is problematic for the majority of 
respondents, expressed by 65% of respondents in 2009. They view counter party risk (89%) as an 
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even greater problem. Most important, both the fact that they are traded OTC and the related 
counterparty risk are viewed as significantly more problematic than before: The fraction of 
respondents that worry about counterparty risk has increased by 9% in just 12 months; over-the-
counter trading is seen as problematic by 12% more. Very clearly, the financial crisis in 
2008/2009 has influenced investors’ views of total return swaps, a possible alternative to ETFs. 
 
[EXHIBIT 15 goes here] 
 
To be able to compare the results across time, we only reported the results for respondents from 
institutional asset management. For this group, we have responses for both 2008 and 2009. Since 
the survey was extended to respondents from private wealth management only in 2009, we only 
have one dataset for this group. In the final section of the paper, we analyse these responses for 
2009 by comparing respondents from private wealth management to those from institutional asset 
management. 
 
5. Use and Perception of ETFs within Private Wealth Management 
 
One of the most appealing characteristics of exchange-traded funds is that they are a convenient 
indexing product for both institutional investors and wealthy individuals. However, private 
investors have different investment needs – and usually less sophisticated investment 
possibilities. In this last section, we compare the answers obtained from institutional investors to 
those of private individuals and private wealth management in order to detect possible differences 
between both investor types. Note that the analysis is restricted to the answers obtained in 2009, 
since we do not have responses of private investors and private wealth managers in 2008.  
 
Exhibit 16 shows the proportion of investors that use exchange-traded funds for various asset 
classes, divided into institutional investors and private investors. The results convey a clear 
message: private investors are more focused on equity ETFs compared to institutional investors: 
93% of all ETF users invest in equity ETFs, which is even a higher level than the fraction of ETF 
users out of institutional investors. Other asset classes are significantly less used by private 
investors, attaining at maximum around 28% for commodity ETFs. The differences to 
institutional investors are most remarkable for government bond ETFs and hedge fund ETFs.  
 
[EXHIBIT 16 goes here] 
 
Next, in exhibit 17, we investigate the satisfaction of private investors with their ETF investment, 
and relate it to the perceived satisfaction by institutional investors. The table shows that private 
investors are remarkably satisfied with their ETF products. Across all asset classes, more than 
60% of the private investors and wealth managers report to be satisfied. In the case of equity 
ETFs, even 98% of respondents judge their ETF investment positively.  Thereby private investors 
clearly surpass the satisfaction levels of institutional investors. The difference in satisfaction 
levels is most pronounced for hedge fund ETFs, which are perceived twice as good, compared to 
instutionals. However, because of a very low usage of hedge fund ETFs by private investors (see 
exhibit 12), this difference is not significant. 
 
[EXHIBIT 17 goes here] 
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Finally, exhibit 18 analyses the fraction of total investments accounted for by exchange-traded 
funds. Similar to exhibit 7, only respondents that actually have invested into this asset class are 
considered. The table shows that, for many asset classes, the faction of ETF investment out of 
total investment does not differ between institutional and private investors. Only in the equity 
ETF segment, there is a highly significant difference: whereas institutional investors allocate 
about a third of their equity investment into ETFs, this faction is 11.5% higher for private 
investors, attaining almost 44% of equity investments that are accounted for by ETFs.6  
 
[EXHIBIT 18 goes here] 
 
One can draw two main conclusions out of this comparison between private and institutional 
investors. First the results suggest that private investors focus their ETF usage mainly to equity 
ETFs, leaving out other ETF types to institutional investors. A second conclusion is that private 
investors are less critical about their ETFs compared to institutional investors. Furthermore, the 
results might indicate that private investors’ opinion on ETFs is less affected by the financial 
crisis than those of institutional investors. Although a direct comparison between 2008 and 2009 
is not possible (because of the lack of data for 2008), the partly very high satisfaction levels 
imply that ETF satisfaction could not have been much higher before the crisis. It is however 
difficult to say whether the higher satisfaction levels originate from a better match of ETF 
products with private investors’ needs, a better selection of existing ETF products, or – by 
contrast – a sign that private investors are less sophisticated, and thus less worried about the 
consequences of the impact of the financial crisis on their overall portfolio performance. 
However, when we compare advanced ETF usage and ETF trading (see exhibit 9) between 
institutional and private investors, we do not detect significant differences.7  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the recent financial crisis on investors’ perceptions of 
exchange-traded funds and other indexing products by comparing the answers to two 
comprehensive surveys on such products carried out in 2008 and 2009. 
The results show that overall investment in ETF products has been remarkable stable during the 
financial turmoil. Compared to 2008, both usage of ETFs and average amount of money invested 
into these products remained largely constant. A more detailed analysis however reveals that the 
crisis has divided the ETF market in two distinct segments. Whereas ETFs in standard asset 
classes, such as equities and government bonds, are more heavily used compared to the year 
before and thus have actually benefited from the crisis, ETFs in some alternative asset classes 
have seen a decrease in usage and get considerably worse evaluations by investors. The findings 
indicate that the more liquid the financial instruments under consideration, the higher the 
satisfaction by investors. Hence, in times of financial crisis, a flight to liquidity can be observed 
in these indexing products, giving ETFs on standard asset classes a clear edge over alternative 
asset class ETFs.  
                                                 
6 As already stressed in section 4.1, these findings do not imply that 44% of all private equity holdings are in held in 
ETFs. Rather, this figure states that among private ETF investors, almost half of their equity holdings are allocated in 
ETFs.   
7 For completeness, we have to say that private investors are significantly less involved in ETF securities lending 
than institutional investors. This is presumably not related to the ETFs, but the fact that securities lending is 
generally less an issue for private investors.  From this point of view it is not clear that the definition of 
„sophisticated investors“ used in section 4.1 is appropriate for private investors. 
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The crisis appears to have strengthened the position of ETFs compared to other index tracking 
products as well. ETFs seem to emerge as the favoured instrument among the different 
possibilities to track an index. In particular, the recent crisis has also increased investors’ 
concerns over counterparty credit risk, especially with total return swaps. ETFs, along with 
futures, are appreciated for their high liquidity, which leads investors to prefer these instruments 
to total return swaps or traditional index funds. The rather positive evaluation of ETFs compared 
to other indexing vehicles also suggests being one of the main reasons why  investors plan to 
increase their future use of ETFs.  
 
Appendix:  
Extract of the survey questions that have been used for this study 
This appendix shows the questions of the 2009 survey that have been used for this study. Note that besides minor 
changes, the questionnaire in 2008 was almost identical to the questionnaire used in 2009. 
 
1. For each asset class below, please indicate the percentage of total investment accounted for by ETFs and ETF-like 
products (open-end question for each asset class, number between 0 and 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. If you use ETFs or ETF-like products, are you satisfied by them (multiple-choice, select one for each asset class)? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Which of the following passive ETFs do you prefer (multiple-choice, select one)? 
Pure replication  
Synthetic replication (i.e., using derivatives)  
Statistical replication (i.e., sampling)  
 
4. Advanced use and forms of ETF (multiple-choice, select one for each question)? 
 Yes No Not familiar with this practice No answer 
Do you use inverse ETFs (short 
ETFs) as a hedging tool? 
    
Do you use options on ETFs?     
Do you short ETFs yourself?     
Do you lend your ETF units?     
 
5. How would you rate ETFs futures, total return swaps, and index funds according to their liquidity (market size, 
counterparties) (multiple-choice, select one for each indexing product)? 
 ETFs Futures Total return swaps Index funds 
Very good     
Fairly good     
poor     
 
6. How do you predict your future use of the following instruments (multiple-choice, select one for each indexing 
product)? 
 ETFs Futures Total return swaps Index funds 
Increase     
Stay the same     
decrease     
Equities Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds 
Commodities Real estate Hedge funds 
      
 Equities 
 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate bonds 
 
Commodities 
 
Real 
estate 
Hedge 
funds 
satisfied       
not satisfied       
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7. Detailed analysis of ETFs, futures, and total return swaps (multiple-choice, select one for each question) 
Concerning ETFs… yes no 
Is the mispricing with regard to net asset value a problem for you?
Concerning futures… yes no 
Is the fact that they are derivative instruments a problem for you?
Are margin calls a problem for you?   
Is the requirement to roll over positions a problem for you?
Concerning total return swaps… yes no 
Is the fact that they are traded OTC a problem for you?
Is the counterparty risk a problem for you?   
 
References 
Allen, F. and E. Carletti (2008): The role of liquidity in financial Crises. University of 
Pennsylvania, working paper. 
Amenc, N., and D. Schröder (2008): The pros and cons of passive hedge fund replication. 
working paper 
Arnott, R. and J. West (2008), What a Difference a Quarter Makes, IndexUniverse, October 30th , 
<www.indexuniverse.com> 
Blanchard, O. J. (2009): The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies. IMF Working 
Paper. 
Brunnermeier, M.K. (2008): Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. 23(1), 77–100. 
Cherry, J. (2004): The Limits of Arbitrage: Evidence from Exchange-Traded Funds. University 
of California, Berkeley, Working Paper. 
Constandinides, C., S. Lan, and B. Huang (2010): ETPs & ETFs: 2009 Market Review & 2010 
Outlook. Deutsche Bank, working paper. 
Deville, L. (2007): Exchange Traded Funds: History, Trading and Research, Handbook of 
Financial Engineering, C. Zopounidis, M. Doumpos, and P. Pardalos (eds.), Springer  
Elton, E.J., M. J. Gruber, G. Comer, and K. Li, 2001, Spiders: Where are the Bugs?, Journal of 
Business, 75(3)  
Elton, E.J., M.J. Gruber and J.A. Busse, 2004, Are Investors Rational? Choices Among Index 
Funds, Journal of Finance, 59(1)  
Engle, R., and D. Sarkar (2006): Premiums-discounts and exchange traded funds. Journal of 
Derivatives 13(4): 27-45. 
Fisher, R.A. (1922). “On the interpretation of χ2 from contingency tables, and the calculation of 
P”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 85(1), pp. 87-94. 
Fuhr, D. (2009): ETF industry review. Barclays Global Investors, working paper. 
Gastineau, G. (2001): Exchange-traded funds: An Introduction. Journal of Portfolio Management 
27(3), 88-93 
Gorton, G. (2008): The panic of 2007. Yale School of Management and NBER, Working Paper. 
International Monetary Fund (2008): Global Financial Stability Report, October 
Kayali, M.M. (2007): Pricing Efficiency of Exchange Traded Funds in Turkey: Early Evidence 
from the Dow Jones Istanbul 20. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 10, 
14-23. 
Kostovetsky, L., 2003: “Index Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds”, Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 29, 80-92. 
Lee, S., and S. Stevenson (2005): The case for REITs in the mixed-asset portfolio in the short and 
long run. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 11(1): 55-80. 
 17
Madura, J. and T. Ngo (2008): Pricing Behavior of Exchange-Traded Funds. Journal of 
Economics and Finance 32(1), 1-23. 
Mizen, P. (2008): The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A discussion of the Background, Market 
Reactions and Responses. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 90(5), pp. 531-67. 
Poterba, J.M. and J.B. Shoven (2002): Exchange-Traded Funds: A New Investment Opportunity 
for Taxable Investors. American Economic Review 92(2), 422-427. 
Reinhart, C.M. and K.S. Rogoff (2008): It the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So 
Different? An International Historical Comparison. NBER working paper 13761. 
Shiller, R.J. (2008): The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, 
and What to Do About it. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA. 
Tucker, J. and P. Sanchez-Marin (2003): Stress Testing ETFs: Will they deliver in Times of 
Crisis?  Institutional investor Guides: ETF and indexing 2, 76-80. 
 
Exhibits 
 
Exhibit 1: TED spread of before and during the financial crisis 
TED Spread
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The TED spread is computed as the difference between the rate reported for the Merrill Lynch indices for LIBOR 
and for US Treasury Bills.  
 
Exhibit 2: Type of Activity of the Respondents  
 2008 2009 Total 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Investment/Asset management 72 70.6% 194 54.3% 266 58.2% 
Life insurance 5 4.9% 8 2.2% 13 2.8% 
Non-life insurance 0 0.0% 4 1.1% 4 0.9% 
Pension fund 14 13.7% 15 4.2% 29 6.3% 
Banks 8 7.8% 10 2.8% 18 3.9% 
Other institutional investors 1 1.0% 11 3.1% 12 2.6% 
Total institutional investors 100 100.0% 242 67.8% 342 74.8% 
Private investor 0 0.0% 18 5.0% 18 3.9% 
Family office, private banker 0 0.0% 97 27.2% 97 21.2% 
Total private wealth management 0 0.0% 115 32.2% 115 25.2% 
Total 100 100.0% 357 100.0% 457 100.0% 
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Exhibit 3: Country of respondents  
 Institutional investors 
Private wealth 
management Total 
 2008 2009 Total 2009 2008-2009 
France 20.4% 28.1% 25.8% 21.7% 24.8% 
Germany 6.1% 5.1% 5.4% 10.4% 6.7% 
Italy 14.3% 5.1% 7.8% 5.2% 7.1% 
Luxembourg 2.0% 5.5% 4.5% 2.6% 4.0% 
Switzerland 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 21.7% 17.0% 
UK 11.2% 17.0% 15.3% 26.1% 18.1% 
other EU 26.5% 20.9% 22.5% 10.4% 19.4% 
non-EU 4.1% 3.0% 3.3% 1.7% 2.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Exhibit 4: Assets under management (in EUR) 
 Institutional investors 
Private wealth 
management Total 
 2008 2009 Total 2009 2008-2009 
<10mn EUR 5.1% 2.2% 3.0% 23.5% 8.2% 
10-100mn EUR 7.6% 12.1% 10.9% 13.7% 11.6% 
100mn-1bn EUR 22.8% 24.7% 24.2% 15.7% 22.0% 
1-10bn EUR 35.4% 23.3% 26.5% 18.6% 24.5% 
10-100bn EUR 19.0% 22.4% 21.5% 12.7% 19.3% 
>100bn EUR 10.1% 15.2% 13.9% 15.7% 14.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Exhibit 5: Usage of exchange-traded funds by institutional investors 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds Corporate bonds Commodities Real estate Hedge funds 
2008 75.0% 38.0% 33.0% 42.0% 31.0% 17.0% 
2009 83.5% 38.8% 31.0% 42.1% 21.5% 17.8% 
Difference 8.5%* 0.8% -2.0% 0.1% -9.5%* 0.8% 
 
We define exchange-traded fund users as investors that indicate to have invested a positive fraction of total assets 
within a given asset class in exchange-traded funds. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test.8 
 
Exhibit 6: Satisfaction levels of exchange-traded funds by institutional investors 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds Corporate bonds Commodities Real estate Hedge funds 
2008 90.5% 86.8% 71.0% 90.5% 83.3% 88.2% 
2009 91.0% 88.4% 70.0% 79.6% 68.8% 34.2% 
Difference 0.5% 1.5% -1.0% -10.9% -14.6% -54.0%*** 
 
The table shows the percentage of users of ETFs and ETF-like products that are satisfied with their investment. *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test. 
 
Exhibit 7: Percentage of total investments accounted for by exchange-traded funds (institutional investors) 
  Equities 
Government 
bonds Corporate bonds Commodities Real estate Hedge funds 
                                                 
8 Fisher's exact test (1922) is a statistical significance test to examine the significance of association of contingency 
tables. We do not report the complete contingency tables, but provide only the p-values under which the null 
hypothesis of no association (i.e. independence) is rejected. 
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2008 22.6% 9.5% 7.0% 16.2% 5.9% 6.9% 
2009 32.3% 16.6% 10.7% 21.9% 14.2% 5.5% 
Difference 9.6%** 7.1%** 3.7% 5.7% 8.3%** -1.4% 
 
The table indicates the average fraction of assets accounted for by exchange-traded funds or similar products for each 
asset class. Only respondents that actually have invested into this asset class are considered, i.e. only respondents that 
indicated a fraction of ETF usage, including a fraction of 0. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** 
statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: t-test of differences of 
means. 
 
Exhibit 8: Preferred replication methods over time (institutional investors) 
 Pure replication 
Synthetic replication (i.e., 
using derivatives) 
Statistical replication 
(e.g., sampling) Total 
2008 66.3% 24.1% 9.6% 100% 
2009 78.0% 13.3% 8.7% 100% 
Difference 11.7% -10.8% -0.9% 0% 
The differences are jointly significant at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test 
 
 
Exhibit 9: Advanced forms and use of ETFs (institutional investors) 
Panel A: Use of inverse ETFs 
 yes no not familiar with this practice Total 
2008 14.0% 80.7% 5.4% 100.0% 
2009 27.7% 67.1% 5.2% 100.0% 
Difference** 13.7% -13.6% -0.2%  
Panel B: Use of options on ETFs 
 yes no not familiar with this practice Total
2008 4.4% 91.1% 4.4% 100.0% 
2009 6.6% 83.8% 9.6% 100.0% 
Difference 2.1% -7.3% 5.2%  
Panel C: Shorting ETFs 
 yes no not familiar with this practice Total 
2008 5.4% 91.4% 3.2% 100.0% 
2009 17.3% 77.0% 5.8% 100.0% 
Difference*** 11.9% -14.4% 2.5%  
Panel D: Lending ETF units 
 yes no not familiar with this practice Total 
2008 8.6% 87.1% 4.3% 100.0% 
2009 16.4% 76.4% 7.3% 100.0% 
Difference 7.8% -10.7% 3.0%  
 
In this table, the Fisher-test indicates the joint statistical difference of the four panels. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 
 
 
Exhibit 10: Differences in usage of exchange-traded funds between sophisticated and non-sophisticated ETF users 
(institutional investors) 
 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities Real estate 
Hedge 
funds 
Sophisticated investors 88.9% 42.1% 35.7% 52.4% 31.0% 26.2% 
Non-sophisticated 
investors 76.4% 36.6% 29.2% 36.1% 20.4% 12.5% 
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Difference 12.5%*** 5.5% 6.5% 16.3%*** 10.6%** 13.7%*** 
 
 
We define sophisticated ETF users those who use at least one of the advances ETF usages as presented in exhibit 9, 
i.e. using short ETFs, options on ETFs, shorting ETFs themselves, or lending ETF units. For a definition of ETF 
usage, please refer to the explanation provided in table 5. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** 
statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test. 
 
 
Exhibit 11: Differences in percentage of total investments accounted for by exchange-traded funds between 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated ETF users (institutional investors) 
 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities 
Real 
estate Hedge funds 
Sophisticated investors 33.5% 16.2% 10.2% 27.0% 14.6% 8.2% 
Non-sophisticated 
investors 27.0% 13.4% 9.3% 16.4% 10.0% 4.6% 
Difference 6.5%* 2.8% 0.9% 10.6%** 4.6% 3.5% 
 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Test: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances. 
 
 
Exhibit 12: Differences in satisfaction between sophisticated and non-sophisticated ETF users (institutional 
investors) 
 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities 
Real 
estate Hedge funds 
Sophisticated investors 94.6% 89.8% 72.1% 80.7% 73.7% 50.0% 
Non-sophisticated 
investors 88.3% 86.7% 69.0% 84.9% 75.0% 52.0% 
Difference 6.3%* 3.1% 3.1% -4.3% -1.3% -2.0% 
 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test. 
 
 
Exhibit 13: Rating of liquidity of indexing products (institutional investors) 
Average score 2008 2009 Difference 
    
ETFs 2.23 2.40 0.16** 
Futures 2.80 2.73 -0.07 
Total return swaps 1.96 1.77 -0.18* 
Index funds 2.10 2.15 0.05 
The table presents the average score to the question: “How would you rate ETFs, futures, total return swaps, and 
index funds according to the following criteria?” The higher the score, the better the products are judged. The score 
is calculated as the mean of the answers, where “very good” is set equal to 3 points, “fairly good” is set equal to 2 
points, and “poor“ is set to 1 point. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at 
the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-
Whitney). 
 
Exhibit 14: Future use of indexing products (institutional investors) 
Average score 2008 2009 Difference 
    
ETFs 2.75 2.79 0.04 
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Futures 2.44 2.33 -0.10 
Total return swaps 2.13 1.85 -0.28*** 
Index funds 2.07 1.86 -0.22
The table presents the average score to the question: “How do you predict would you rate ETFs, futures, total return 
swaps, and index funds according to the following criteria?” The higher the score, the more the products are 
expected to be used. The score is calculated as the mean of the answers, where “increase in usage” is set equal to 3 
points, “stay the same” is set equal to 2 points, and “decrease in usage” is set to 1 point. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% 
level. Test: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney). 
 
Exhibit 15: Specific problems of exchange-traded funds, futures, and total return swaps 
Panel A: ETFs       
  2008 2009 Difference 
Mispricing with respect to NAV is a problem 72.0% 63.8% -8.3% 
    
Panel B: Futures     
  2008 2009 Difference 
Margin calls are a problem 42.9% 39.4% -3.5% 
Rolling over position is a problem 41.8% 24.3% -17.4%* 
Being a derivative product is a problem 25.3% 25.6% 0.3% 
    
Panel C: Total return swaps     
  2008 2009 Difference 
OTC trading is a problem 53.0% 65.1% 12.1%* 
Counterparty risk is a problem 80.0% 88.9% 8.9%* 
 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test 
 
Exhibit 16: Usage of exchange-traded funds by institutional investors and private wealth managers in 2009 
 Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities Real estate 
Hedge 
funds 
Institutional 
Investors 83.5% 38.8% 31.0% 42.1% 21.5% 24.4% 
Private Wealth 
Management 93.0% 20.2% 14.9% 27.7% 10.7% 6.6% 
Difference 9.6% -18.6%** -16.1% -14.5% -10.7%*** -17.8% 
Average 86.6% 40.1% 31.1% 47.3% 21.8% 21.0%
 
We define exchange-traded fund users as investors that indicate to have invested a positive fraction of total assets 
within a given asset class in exchange-traded funds. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test. 
 
Exhibit 17: Satisfaction levels of exchange-traded funds by institutional investors and private wealth managers in 
2009 
  Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities Real estate 
Hedge 
funds 
Institutional 
Investors 91.0% 88.4% 70.0% 79.6% 68.8% 34.2% 
Private Wealth 
Management 98.1% 84.4% 67.7% 87.9% 80.8% 61.5% 
Difference 7.1%** -3.9% -2.3% 8.3% 12.0% 27.3% 
 
The table shows the percentage of users of ETFs and ETF-like products that are satisfied with their investment. *** 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Test: Fisher-test. 
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Exhibit 18: Percentage of total investments accounted for by exchange-traded funds in 2009 (institutional investors 
and private wealth managers) 
  Equities 
Government 
bonds 
Corporate 
bonds Commodities Real estate 
Hedge 
funds 
Institutional 
Investors 32.3% 16.6% 10.7% 21.9% 14.2% 5.5% 
Private Wealth 
Management 43.8% 18.7% 16.2% 23.9% 8.3% 3.7% 
Difference 11.5%*** 2.1% 5.6% 2.0% -5.9% -1.9% 
 
The table indicates the average fraction of assets accounted for by exchange-traded funds or similar products for each 
asset class. Only respondents that actually have invested into this asset class are considered, i.e. only respondents that 
indicated a fraction of ETF usage, including a fraction of 0. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** 
statistical significance at the 5% level, and * the statistical significance at the 10% level. Test: t-test of differences of 
means. 
